Abstract: This Article argues that the pending feuds between neighboring states over marijuana decriminalization demonstrate the need for a strict doctrine limit-
choices, will be exercising the independently valued freedom of local selfdetermination within their respective spheres." 9 This dichotomy has long been viewed as one of federalism's great virtues. As one commentator noted just over a decade ago, "When citizens can choose among and compare the virtues of the permission of assisted suicide in Oregon, covenant marriage in Louisiana, . . . and same-sex unions in Vermont, we are likely to have a society that is morally richer, practically freer, and personally more fulfilling . . . ."
10 And sometimes-as the Supreme Court's recent recognition that the Fourteenth Amendment endows same-sex couples with a fundamental right to marry-such state-level experiments can shed light upon "unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged." 11 The ultimate embrace of same-sex marriage by the Court (and the court of public opinion) 12 -unthinkable when Vermont made the then-ground-breaking decision to recognize civil unions in 2000 13 -demonstrates the merits of Brandeisian experimentation. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 14 But sometimes one state's "experiment" produces harmful side-effects that extend beyond its borders. North Dakota's lax regulation of its coal-heavy power industry produces pollution that falls upon neighboring Minnesota. 15 Likewise, Colorado's embrace of a wide-open commercial marijuana market produces harm that extends well beyond its borders. 16 Reasonable minds can differ over whether marijuana's negative externalities justify the costs of its prohibition. But fanciful assertions that pot is an 9 Neuman, supra note 2, at 314. 10 Kreimer, supra note 8, at 974. 11 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 , 2603 . 12 should be able to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to sue sister states for "emissions of air pollution from coal-fired" powered plants because such plants "significantly contribute, to substantial adverse effects on the health and welfare of citizens of the [plaintiff] State," and cause "damage to the State's natural resources and economy, and harm to the State's finances"). 16 See infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text (discussing some of the harmful effects of marijuana); see also DeVeaux & Mostad-Jensen, supra note 6, at 1855-59 (addressing transboundary spillover effects of Colorado's marijuana market). unmitigated social good are pure fiction. 17 Marijuana abuse causes "longlasting changes in brain function that can jeopardize educational, professional, and social achievements." 18 These changes can manifest themselves in "impairments in memory and attention," and "significant declines in IQ." 19 Though medical marijuana benefits many, 20 assertions that pot legalization is a free lunch-while sometimes taken at face value by the media 21 -enjoy no support in peer-reviewed scholarship or "accepta [nce] in the relevant scientific community." 22 Although alcohol raises most of these same concerns, 23 the paradoxical treatment of the two vices does not alter the constitutional calculus. Marijuana 17 The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws ("NORML") has argued that though "Cannabis [use] . . . has a negative impact on decision time and trajectory," stoned drivers do not "represent a traffic safety risk" because marijuana consumption "leads to a more cautious style of driving." Marijuana and Driving: A Review of the Scientific Evidence, NORML, http://norml.org/ library/item/marijuana-and-driving-a-review-of-the-scientific-evidence [https://perma.cc/AKN2-XRY2] (last visited Feb. 3, 2017) . 18 com/articles/2012/01/13/is-pot-good-for-lungs-new-marijuana-study-adds-to-health-effects-debate. html [https://perma.cc/5LEV-V43U] (suggesting that smoking marijuana may increase lung function); Rick Simpson's Hemp-Oil Medicine, HIGH TIMES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web/2013 1114074056/http://www.hightimes.com/read/rick-simpsons-hemp-oil-medicine (praising a "miraculous cannabis-oil medicine" said to cure skin cancer and cervical cancer). 22 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 23 See Martin D. Carcieri, Obama, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Drug War, 44 AKRON L. REV. 303, 312 (2011) ("We are entitled to know how justice can really exist when adults who privately consume marijuana are criminals while adults who consume far more dangerous substances like alcohol and tobacco, even in public, are within their rights for reasons that are widely understood.").
prohibition triggers only the deferential rational-basis test. 24 Under this standard, a law must be sustained so long as it can "be thought to further a legitimate governmental goal, without reference to whether it does so at inordinate cost." 25 Prohibition furthers the legitimate objective of mitigating the referenced harms associated with marijuana use. Thus, states are within their rights to outlaw the drug-as the majority have done.
But states cannot, choose between decriminalization and prohibition in a vacuum. Marijuana is the most lucrative cash crop in the United States. 26 The resulting "high demand for marijuana in the interstate market will draw" weed acquired in pot-friendly states "into that market" thereby having a "substantial effect on the supply and demand" of the drug in the black markets of prohibitionist states. 27 So how can states exercise their "freedom of local selfdetermination" to "afford more freedom than the mean" or "less than the mean" with regard to marijuana policy? 28 A state, like Colorado, that chooses to decriminalize the drug implicitly imposes its choice upon its neighbors, inhibiting their "freedom of local self-determination."
29 Conversely, if a prohibitionist state, like Nebraska, is able to quell marijuana decriminalization in Colorado, then it interferes with the latter's power to "afford more freedom than the mean."
30 Marijuana decriminalization, therefore, presents one of the most vexing federalism problems of the twenty-first century. 30 See id. 31 Using the Coase Theorem (which argues "that if transaction costs are eliminated, 'parties will negotiate the efficient solution to . . . nuisance problem[s]'") as a guide, Anne Mostad-Jensen and I have argued that marijuana spillover is analogous to pollution and that pot-friendly states should compensate their neighbors for harm caused by such spillover. DeVeaux & Mostad-Jensen, supra note 6, at 1840-43; accord id. at 1889-96 (suggesting that the Coase theorem could instruct courts on how to best address the cross-border market for drugs). 32 The Constitution expressly endows the Supreme Court with "original jurisdiction" over "Controversies between two or more States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Congress has made the Court's jurisdiction over such cases "exclusive." 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012) . 33 36 The court opined that a trio of 1980s Supreme Court opinions which purport to hold that the dormant Commerce Clause ("DCC") "precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the state" 37 are no longer binding.
38
The Tenth Circuit ironically upheld Colorado's purported regulation of commercial transactions in Nebraska-laws aimed at curbing reliance on Nebraska's coal-fired power plants. 39 most dormant doctrine in dormant commerce clause jurisprudence," 40 Justice Gorsuch opined that the doctrine has died of atrophy, as the Supreme Court has not invoked it to invalidate a state law in more than a generation. 41 Joining a growing chorus of critics who argue that "the extraterritoriality doctrine . . . is a relic of the old world with no useful role to play in the new," 42 the court posited that the DCC, in fact, only prohibits economic balkanization. 43 Thus, states may presumably enforce non-protectionist laws that directly regulate extraterritorial conduct if that conduct "affects a substantial number of in-state residents" 44 -at least as long as the burden imposed on interstate commerce is not "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 45 While Colorado celebrated its newfound power to impose its judgments on Nebraskans, the festivities might be short lived. Colorado failed to recognize the impact that the extraterritorial doctrine's apparent demise will have on its own marijuana-legalization experiment. Sauce for the goose is, after all, sauce for the gander. 46 What prevents Nebraska from regulating Colorado marijuana transactions affecting a substantial number of Nebraska residents? 47 Part I of this Article provides background for the rise of the DCC's extraterritoriality doctrine, as well as its purported fall. 48 Part II argues that the in- 40 Epel, 793 F.3d at 1170. 41 See id. at 1172. But see BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572 (invoking the extraterritoriality doctrine to invalidate a jury verdict punishing the defendant for engaging in out-of-state conduct that was lawful in the states where it was conducted, but illegal in the forum state). 42 68 For example, California sets high emission standards on cars sold in the state. 69 This regulation induces automakers wishing to avoid operating separate assembly lines for California-bound vehicles to "sell only California-compliant cars . . . nationwide." 70 California's law does not directly regulate out-of-state commerce. A Michigan automaker that sells a car in its own state that does not meet California's rigorous standards faces no risk of prosecution by California authorities.
Precedent recognizes that the sometimes-elusive distinction between "direct" and "incidental" extraterritorial regulation is critically important. 71 The
Court's DCC jurisprudence dictates that state regulations that run afoul of the prohibition against direct regulation must be subjected to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity. 84 The statute required that anyone making a takeover offer for shares of a "target company" notify Illinois's Secretary of State and the company twenty days before the offer became effective. 85 The law defined a "target company" as "a corporation . . . of which shareholders located in Illinois own 10% of the class of equity securities subject to the offer," 86 or in the alternative, any corporation satisfying two of three conditions: "the corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized under the laws of Illinois, or has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented within the State." 87 In 1979, MITE made a tender offer to purchase all the shares of the Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., a publicly held Illinois corporation. 88 Rather than complying with Illinois's anti-takeover law, MITE filed suit seeking to enjoin its enforcement. 89 The Edgar Court struck down the statute. 90 A four-justice plurality opinion penned by Justice White concluded that Illinois's law offended the sovereignty of sister states. 91 The plurality concluded that the DCC prohibits attempts to regulate outof-state transactions.
92 It "precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State." 93 Such regulation "'exceed[s] the inherent limits of the State's power.'" 94 82 The case discussions in this Subsection and the footnotes herein are drawn from and closely track the text of a prior Article. DeVeaux, supra note 56, at 1009-11. 83 Edgar, 457 U.S. at 624. 84 Id. 85 Id. at 626-27. 86 Id. at 627. 87 Id. 88 Id. 89 Id. at 628. 90 Id. at 646 (plurality opinion). 91 Id. at 643, 646. 92 Id. at 641-43. 93 Id. at 642-43. 94 Id. at 643 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977) ). While the Court invalidated the anti-takeover law in Edgar, it took care to distinguish the statute from state laws governing the internal affairs of corporations created under the regulating state's own law. The internal-affairs doctrine is "a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the 96 There, the Court confronted New York's Alcoholic Beverage Control Law ("ABC Law"), which required distributors to file a monthly price schedule with the State Liquor Agency specifying the prices at which they would sell their products to wholesalers for that month. 97 The law required distributors to affirm that those prices were "no higher than the lowest price the distiller [would] charge[] wholesalers anywhere else in the United States" for the month in which the affirmation was made. 98 The challenger, a Kentucky distiller, 99 conceded that the statute regulated all distributors "evenhandedly" and that New York enacted it for a "legitimate," i.e. non-discriminatory purpose: "to assure the lowest possible prices for its residents." 100 Nonetheless, the Court found that the statute offended the DCC because it "effectively regulate[d] the price at which liquor [wa] As the Court explained, "Massachusetts requires brewers to post their prices on the first day of the month to become effective on the first day of the following month."
112 Nonetheless, "[f]ive days later . . . those same brewers, in order to sell beer in Connecticut, must affirm that their Connecticut prices for the following month will be no higher than the lowest price that they are charging in any border State."
113 Thus, as a result of the price-affirmation statute, "on January 1, when a brewer posts his February prices for Massachusetts, that 102 Id. at 579. 103 Id. at 582. 104 Reaffirming the extraterritoriality principles elucidated by the Edgar plurality and adopted by Brown-Forman, the Healy Court offered a summary of the doctrine. "Taken together, our our cases concering the extraterritorial effects of state economic regulation state at a minimum" for two important principles.
119 "First, the [DCC] 'precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.'" 120 Second, the DCC dictates that any "statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a state exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State's authority" and ordinarily must be stricken without further inquiry. 
B. The Purported Demise of the DCC's Extraterritoriality Doctrine
From its inception, the DCC's extraterritoriality doctrine has faced unrelenting academic attack. 129 Critics charged that the doctrine is mere dicta, 130 that it "is a relic of the old world with no useful role to play in the new," 131 and that it "inhibits state experimentation with laws that attempt to solve their social and economic problems."
132 Yet, despite these challenges, the lower federal courts dutifully adhered to Brown-Forman's pronouncements for nearly three decades. 133 But after the Sixth Circuit's controversial 2012 decision in American Beverage Association v. Snyder cracks in this resolve began to develop.
American Beverage Association v. Snyder
American Beverage Association involved an amendment to Michigan's "Bottle Deposit" law. 134 The statute required consumers to pay a deposit on purchases of "returnable containers," (bottles or cans) that will be refunded when used containers are redeemed at groceries and department stores. 135 Almost from the start, Michigan noted an "over-redemption" problem-"the val- 126 Id. (emphasis omitted). 127 Id. at 340. 128 Id. at 341. 129 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (citing to authorities criticizing the DCC's extraterritoriality doctrine). 130 See infra notes 174-198 (providing an overview of the argument that the extraterritoriality doctrine is merely dicta, and then making the opposite argument). 131 Am. Beverage Ass'n, 700 F.3d at 812 (Sutton, J., concurring In response, Michigan's legislature enacted a law requiring bottlers to brand Michigan-sold containers with a mark that is "unique to the state." 140 The statute prohibited bottlers from selling containers bearing this "unique mark" in states that did not have a bottle deposit scheme similar to Michigan's.
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Bottlers challenged the statute, asserting that by prohibiting the sale of containers bearing Michigan's mark in other states, the "unique-mark requirement" directly regulated extraterritorial commerce.
142 Although the Michigan law was not protectionist in nature-"the same unique marking requirement applie [d] equally to in-state and out-of-state manufacturers"
143 -the court concluded that the statute directly regulated out-of-state transactions in violation of Brown-Forman. The court noted that Michigan's "unique-mark requirement" did more than simply require manufacturers to meet Michigan-specific requirements for containers sold in Michigan, which is permissible, but it also dictated where products bearing that mark could be sold. 144 153 Michael Dorf argued that the DCC "operates as a kind of default principle" whereby "[t]he courts presume that Congress would preempt" paternalistic or discriminatory state laws if it possessed "the capacity to keep track of and override" all such laws. Michael C. Dorf, Is the Dormant Commerce Clause a "Judicial Fraud"?, VERDICT (May 20, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/05/20/is-thedormant-commerce-clause-a-judicial-fraud [https://perma.cc/5ZKL-APPA]. Dorf continued, "The fact that Congress has the power to override a judicial ruling finding a DCC violation acts as a failsafe in case the presumption fails." Id. Michigan's label law represents the exceptional case where a state "projected its legislation" into a neighbor without offending the latter's sovereignty. See Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521. Rather than upend the DCC's "default principle," Congress should simply exercise its failsafe option by enacting a law authorizing Michigan to project its "unique-mark requirement" into other jurisdictions. 154 Epel, 793 F.3d at 1169. 155 Id. at 1170. 156 Id.
Energy and Environment Legal Institute ("EELI"), a trade group, brought suit challenging the law on behalf of out-of-state coal companies. 157 EELI claimed that because the law "means some out-of-state coal producers . . . will lose business with out-of-state utilities who feed their power onto the [electrical] grid," 158 Colorado's statute has "the practical effect of 'control[ling] conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.'" 159 EELI's suit implicitly charged Colorado with regulating commercial transactions in Nebraska because Colorado, "a net importer of electricity," 160 imports a significant amount of electricity from coal-fired plants in Nebraska. 161 Because the Colorado mandate's effects on out-of-state commerce are merely incidental, the law should not have triggered the extraterritorial doctrine in the first place. 162 Yet, inexplicably the Epel court accepted EELI's premise. Noting that Colorado's mandate has "the effect of increasing demand for electricity generated using renewable sources" and "reduc[ing] demand for . . . electricity generated using fossil fuels," 163 Justice Gorsuch contended that the DCC's extraterritoriality bar no longer inhibits a state's ability to regulate transactions beyond its borders-at least when the statute "does not dictate the price of a product and does not 't[ie] the price of its in-state products to out-ofstate prices. '" 164 Labeling the extraterritoriality jurisprudence "the most dormant doctrine in [DCC] jurisprudence," 165 Justice Gorsuch asserted that the doctrine has died of atrophy, as the Supreme Court has not invoked it to invalidate a state law in more than a generation. 166 Siding with critics of the doctrine-particularly Brannon Denning, who offered a purported "autopsy" of Brown-Forman in American Beverage Association's aftermath 167 -Justice Gorsuch posited that the extraterritoriality doctrine has been reduced to "an application of the antidiscrimination rule." 168 protectionist laws that directly regulate extraterritorial conduct 169 if that conduct "affects a substantial number of in-state residents" 170 -at least as long as "the burden imposed" on interstate commerce is not "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
171

C. Reports of the Extraterritoriality Doctrine's Demise Stem from a Fundamental Misunderstanding of the Principle
If one accepts Epel's contention that the extraterritoriality doctrine has slipped this mortal coil, a fundamental question remains: What was the cause of death? The Supreme Court, after all, has never repudiated the doctrine. Lacking the corpus delicti 172 -"visible evidence" of the killing, e.g., "the dead body of a murdered person" 173 -the doctrine's deniers usually point to two purportedly fatal blows.
The Extraterritoriality Doctrine Is Not Dicta
Brown-Forman recognizes that the DCC "precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State" 174 Yet, despite the Court's plain statements, extraterritoriality deniers have long contended that precedent only prohibits discriminatory laws-"regulatory measures designed 169 Epel did suggest that laws that "dictate the price of a product" sold out-of-state or that "'t[ie] the price of in-state products to out-of-state prices" still run afoul of the DCC. For more than two decades, the lower courts rejected these contentions, heeding the Supreme Court's pronouncements. 182 Nonetheless, in recent years jurists have begun to succumb to these arguments in dicta and dissent. 183 As I've stated before, assertions that the extraterritoriality doctrine is mere dicta baffle me. 184 The Healy Court explicitly based its holding on two separate grounds, unambiguously striking the offending statute both because it discriminated against out-of-state commerce, 185 and because it directly "regulat[ed] commerce occurring wholly outside [the] State's borders." 186 Extraterritoriality deniers' oft-repeated argument that they can unilaterally ignore one of the Court's dual bases ignores a fundamental tenet of our legal system: "[W]here a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum."
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The deniers' dismissal of Brown-Forman is even more puzzling. There, the statute's challenger, Brown-Forman Distillers, conceded on the record that New York's price-affirmation statute was not discriminatory, acknowledging that it regulated all distillers "evenhandedly" and was enacted for a "legitimate"-non-discriminatory purpose-"to assure the lowest possible prices for its residents."
188 Admittedly, Brown-Forman's decision to concede the statute's neutrality is a questionable one. A New York law barring liquor vendors from selling their wares in other states at lower prices than they charge in New York inherently discriminates against out-of-state distillers. New York's cost of living far exceeds the national average. 189 Forcing a business to sell its goods to Kentucky consumers at New York prices is transactional suicide. 190 The statute thus discouraged distillers based in other states from selling their goods in New York, creating an advantage for local distillers who did not do business in other parts of the country.
In apparent recognition of this fact, Judge Sutton asserted in his American Beverage Association concurrence that "[a]ll told," he is "not aware of a single Supreme Court [DCC] holding that relied exclusively on the extraterritoriality doctrine to invalidate a state law."
191 But this normative analysis ignores yet another fundamental tenet of the American legal system: Brown-Forman's concession that New York's law regulated all distillers "evenhandedly" is binding. 192 The Supreme Court has "long recognized" that litigants may rely on the assumption that the facts as stipulated in the record are established.
193 This axiom "is the bookend to a party's undertaking to be bound by the factual stipulations it submits."
194 Thus, it is evident that Brown-Forman's edict cannot rest on the alleged discriminatory nature of the statute. More importantly, the Orwellian revisionism suggested by extraterritoriality deniers ignores an even more critical facet of our stare-decisis-driven system. As Judge Friendly observed when he addressed Erie deniers' unrelenting arguments that the decision's federalism contentions likewise were mere dicta, "[a] court's stated and, on its view, necessary basis for deciding does not become dictum because a critic would have decided on another basis." 196 It is inexplicable to me how so many respected scholars and jurists have ignored this tenet. The Brown-Forman Court regarded its finding that the offending statute "directly regulated interstate commerce" 197 as "a necessary basis for deciding" the case. Justice Gorsuch castigated the extraterritoriality principle as "the most dormant doctrine in the [DCC] jurisprudence." 199 Noting that nearly three decades have passed since the U.S. Supreme Court last invoked it to invalidate a state law, Judge Sutton argued in his American Beverage Association concurrence that "the extraterritoriality doctrine has been lost to time"; that it "is a relic of the old world with no useful role to play in the new." 200 A Harvard Law Review case comment contends that the "doctrine no longer furthers the [DCC's] purpose." 201 Professor Denning agrees, asserting that the doctrine fell victim to constitutional "calcification." 202 He offered a purported eulogy, positing "that extraterritoriality . . . is dead, and unlikely to be revived by the current Court." 203 Justice Gorsuch relied in large measure on this "post-mortem" analysis, concluding in Epel that the DCC's extraterritoriality doctrine is, indeed, dead. 204 edents." 205 Our courts "use decades-old and centuries-old precedents to achieve consistency over time." 206 More importantly, upon closer examination, most critiques of the Supreme Court's extraterritoriality jurisprudence reveal a complete misapprehension of the doctrine. They conflate the DCC's anti-obstructionist function, which limits state authority to regulate purely intrastate conduct by imposing regulations that induce regulated actors to alter their out-of-state conduct, with its sovereign-capacity function, which bars states from directly regulating extraterritorial conduct.
Many purely intrastate regulations incidentally affect extraterritorial commerce. Every state law requiring a manufacturer to label a product to inform consumers of a known hazard will incidentally alter labels in neighboring jurisdictions; manufacturers will wish to avoid the expense of separately labeling products bound for a particular state. A blanket prohibition on such laws would offend state sovereignty. 207 Thus, a law's extraterritorial effects will only presumptively condemn it on the rare occasion when it aims to actually "punish [actors] for conduct that was lawful [in the state] where it occurred."
208
For example, the Brown-Forman Court ruled New York's ABC law per se unconstitutional because it directly regulated liquor sales in other states-it prohibited Brown-Forman from lowering its prices in Kentucky without approval from the New York State Liquor Authority. 209 New York directly applied its laws to transactions in other states. 210 Conversely, in the 1945 case Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, the Supreme Court did not apply the per se rule of invalidity to an Arizona law limiting freight trains to seventy cars. 211 Although the statute incidentally affected extraterritorial conduct-inducing railroads to shorten Arizona-bound trains to seventy cars to avoid breaking them up at the Arizona state line 212 -it did not directly regulate extraterritorial conduct. 213 The law did not "punish [railroads] for conduct that was lawful [in the state] where it occurred." 214 Railroads could operate trains exceeding seventy cars in neighboring states without fear of prosecution by Arizona authorities. 215 Brown-Forman did not have that luxury. Selling bourbon in Kentucky at prices New York disapproved of would invite prosecution in New York. 216 Statutes of the sort confronted by the Southern Pacific Court are subject to the deferential Pike test. They "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 217 In contrast, laws that directly regulate out-of-state conduct-as in Brown-Forman-are unconstitutional virtually per se. 218 Blatant state paternalism of the sort confronted in Brown-Forman is quite rare. 219 Thus, the Supreme Court has had few occasions to evaluate such laws. This has not stopped trade groups-eager to evade burdensome regulationsfrom bringing suits casting purely intrastate laws as impermissible extraterritorial regulation. 222 Foie gras is produced by "force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size." 223 The plaintiffs contended that the statute "control[led] commerce outside of California." 224 The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim, correctly observing that a statute is not subject to Brown-Forman's per se rule of invalidity "merely because it affects in some way the flow of commerce between the States." 225 Rather, a statute is only un-constitutional "per se when it directly regulates interstate commerce" 226 -that is when it seeks "to punish [an actor] for conduct that was lawful where it occurred." 227 Applying this principle, the court upheld California's ban, concluding that it did not directly regulate out-of-state poultry producers; it merely dictated that certain products could not be sold in California. 228 The statute's effects on extraterritorial conduct were merely incidental. An Oregon farmer faced no liability for force-feeding ducks in Oregon; only for selling foie gras in California. 229 Most courts have seen past efforts by trade groups to exploit the extraterritoriality doctrine to evade legitimate intrastate regulations. 230 But many in the academic community-and a few jurists, including Justice Gorsuch-have fallen prey to this misdirection, viewing judicial rejection of such misguided arguments as evidence that the prohibition against direct extraterritorial regulation is dead. 231 Judge Sutton is another such victim. In his American Beverage Association concurrence, he observed that "[t]he modern reality is that the States frequently regulate activities that occur entirely within one State but that have effects in many." 232 As an example, he observed that Vermont's regulation that light bulbs sold in the state include labels that warn against the negative affects of mercury leads light-bulb makers to put such labels on bulbs sold in other states to avoid the cost of separately labeling their Vermont-bound bulbs. 233 Other critics have echoed these observations. Professor Denning contends that lower court opinions "reject[ing] extraterritoriality arguments brought by manufacturers whose products must be labeled in a particular way before being sold in a state, even if compliance with the state law would require changes in their out-of-state manufacturing processes" confirm the extraterritoriality doctrine's demise. 234 Likewise, a Harvard Law Review case comment pointed out that since Brown-Forman and Healy, "the Supreme Court has . . . upheld many state regulations that significantly affect interstate commerce." 235 Fair enough. But these arguments make the all-too-common mistake of confusing the DCC's sovereign-capacity function with its anti-obstructionist function. 236 For example, Professors Goldsmith and Sykes-condemning the extraterritoriality doctrine-noted that "regulatory uniformity is often undesirable" because a state's "[p]revailing attitudes . . . may depend on the religious and cultural backgrounds of the local citizenry" and "geographic factors may directly affect the value of regulation." 237 244 Pursuant to the statute, the state assumes the role of "pharmacy benefit manager" 245 to negoti-ate rebates with pharmaceutical companies to fund reduced prices for medications purchased by eligible Mainers. 246 Out-of-state drug manufacturers challenged the statute, arguing that by requiring them to make rebate payments for Maine-bound drugs, the statute controls the terms of their contracts with wholesalers outside of Maine. 247 The drug makers argued that the law "change[d] the economic terms of [such outof-state] transactions" by inducing them to charge higher prices to avoid suffering a reduction in "the price" they receive in their "out-of-state wholesale sales of drugs that ultimately cross pharmacy counters in Maine." 248 The Court rejected these arguments, concluding that the law, at most, induces drug makers to make rebate payments to Maine authorities for drugs actually sold to consumers in Maine. 249 The statute does not directly regulate the terms of contracts between pharmaceutical companies and wholesalers-in Maine or elsewhere. 250 Unlike the statutes struck down in Healy and BrownForman-which subjected vendors to penalties for selling their wares to consumers in other jurisdictions without the approval of the regulating state-the effect of Maine's law on out-of-state pharmaceutical sales to wholesalers is merely incidental. 251 Because the drug makers know that they must make rebate payments for Maine-bound drugs, they charge wholesalers higher prices to defray some of the cost. 252 For this reason, the Walsh Court concluded that the law did not run afoul of the extraterritoriality doctrine. Unlike the statutes tackled by Brown-Forman and Healy, "the Maine Act does not regulate the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by its express terms or by its inevitable effect." 253 Nor does Maine "insist that manufacturers sell their drugs to a wholesaler for a certain price." 254 Accordingly, the Maine law does not directly regulate activities beyond the state's borders; rather, it "only has incidental effects on interstate commerce." 255 260 Walsh did no such thing. The Court has similarly observed that "Marbury v. Madison was a recognition of the power of Congress over the term of office of a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia."
261 By the logic of the Ninth Circuit, this means that Marbury's broader pronouncement that it is "the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" 262 should now be limited to cases involving attempts to interfere with Congress's control "over the term of office of a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia."
263 Nonsense. Walsh merely reached the unremarkable conclusion that statutes that regulate intrastate activity are not per se unconstitutional merely because they incidentally affect interstate transactions. This enables states to "try novel social and economic experiments" within their own borders, but prohibits them from conscripting the citizens or property of neighboring states as guinea pigs in their experiments. 264 Yet, the Epel court, relying on Professor Denning's flawed reading, concluded that Walsh repudiated the DCC's extraterritoriality doctrine. 265 Worse, the court failed to recognize that Colorado's renewable-energy mandate does not directly regulate out-of-state conduct. The Colorado mandate's effects on electricity generators in Nebraska and other states are merely incidental.
Colorado's statute directs the state's utilities "to ensure that 20% of the electricity they sell to Colorado consumers comes from renewable sources."
266
Noting that "Colorado is a net importer of electricity," the Epel plaintiffs asserted that the law constitutes impermissible extraterritorial regulation because "some out-of-state coal producers . . . will lose business" to more environmentally friendly producers. 267 Accepting the plaintiffs' assertions for purposes of argument that Colorado's regulation constitutes direct regulation of extraterritoriality commerce, 268 the court posited that the DCC's prohibition against such regulation is no longer binding. 269 its express terms or by its inevitable effect." 275 Epel rightly concluded that the law is constitutional 276 -but for the wrong reason. Abandonment of the DCC's prohibition against direct extraterritorial regulation will not facilitate "state experimentation with laws that attempt to solve their social and economic problems," as critics contend. 277 To the contrary, investing states with such power would bring a swift end to Brandeisian experimentation. " [R] 287 The third variety of cases, the Pike line, scrutinizes "state laws burdening interstate commerce" that produce "insufficient offsetting local benefits" to justify those burdens. 288 Justice Gorsuch was dismissive of the Pike doctrine, calling it "a pretty grand, even 'ineffable,' all-things-considered sort of test" that requires "judges (to attempt) to compare wholly incommensurable goods for wholly different populations"-"measuring the burdens on out-of-staters against the benefits to in-staters." 289 Yet ultimately while Epel abandoned the extraterritoriality doctrine, it left both Pike and the DCC's anti-protectionist prohibitions unmolested.
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The DCC's protectionism ban would not restrain a prohibitionist state's regulation of marijuana transactions in a pot-friendly neighbor. Such regulation would not advantage in-state pot sellers over out-of-state competitors. The prohibitionist state's aim is to evenhandedly thwart in-state and out-of-state pot sellers alike. Nonetheless, the Pike test would impose some limits on such regulation.
B. The Pike Test
Pike's modern balancing test, though "lack[ing] in precision," 291 puts a heavy thumb on the regulating state's side of the scale. 292 It recognizes that states enjoy a "wide scope" of authority concerning the regulation of intrastate matters even when regulations may impact interstate commerce. 293 In particular, cases "where local safety measures" are found to "place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce" will be "few in number." 294 Thus, as Judge Posner has observed, a litigant seeking to invalidate a law under Pike "has a steep hill to climb." Since Lochner's repudiation, 296 the Supreme Court has only struck down four laws under this doctrine. In three of these cases, the putative local interest served by the offending law proved to be of "dubious advantage." 297 In the fourth-Pike itself-the law's putative benefit was "tenuous" at best. 302 Id. at 374-75. I have sometimes criticized the traditional case method's propensity to condition students to view litigants as abstract subjects-the legal equivalent of lab rats-that exist only to illustrate the application of legal principles. I believe that human dignity animates the Constitution and that cases should be understood as much for their real-world impact on the litigants as for the rules they produce. Mrs. Morgan's story demonstrates this principle as well as any in the United States Reports. 303 In contrast to the "dubious" local benefits conferred by the statutes in Morgan, Southern Pacific, and Bibb, 323 the Pike Court found that Arizona's "asserted state interest [was] a legitimate" albeit "tenuous" one. 324 Nonetheless, the Court found that the burden the regulation imposed on interstate commerce, requiring the construction of "an unneeded $200,000 packing plant"-more than $1.2 million in today's dollars 325 -was clearly excessive in relation to its local benefit.
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C. How Does Pike Apply to State Laws Regulating Out-of-State
Marijuana Transactions?
Many prohibitionist state laws banning the sale of marijuana in potfriendly states to the prohibitionist state's citizens would survive "the deferential Pike balancing test." 327 Pike noted that "the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will . . . depend on the nature of the local interest involved . . . ."
328
In particular, the Court has recognized that in balancing the local benefits of a state's law against its interstate burdens, "the peculiarly local nature of th[e] subject of safety" dictates that laws enhancing local public safety bear the most weight.
329 Such "measures carry a strong presumption of validity . . . ."
330
A Nebraska statute banning pot sales in Colorado to visiting Huskers would constitute a quintessential safety measure. At least one study suggests that since Colorado first permitted the commercial sale of marijuana, the state has witnessed a ninety-two percent increase in fatal car accidents involving stoned drivers. 331 Because marijuana purchased at dispensaries is not consumed on site, 332 Nebraskans who buy Colorado pot are likely to consume the ty who is a citizen of the regulating state at the time of sale. 358 But due process also protects litigants from "unfair surprise."
359 Although a merchant who sells goods to a known Nebraskan must anticipate that Nebraska law could apply to their transaction, 360 a Colorado business that transacts with a Nebraskan it reasonably believes to be a Coloradan would be "unfairly surprised" by the application of Nebraska law. 361 In contrast, a Nebraska statute punishing Colorado dispensaries that sell pot to consumers they know or have reason to know are Huskers would not subject vendors to "unfair surprise" 362 or impose "clearly excessive" burdens on interstate commerce. 363 Colorado law dictates that "[p]rior to initiating a sale, the employee of the retail marijuana store making the sale shall verify that the purchaser has a valid identification card showing the purchaser is twenty-one years of age or older." 364 A dispensary transacting with someone who presents Nebraska-issued identification will be on notice that it is transacting with a Nebraskan. 365 Requiring marijuana vendors to decline to sell pot to individuals who present such identification would therefore not impose any additional burdens upon sellers. Sellers are already obligated to require prospective purchasers to present identification and to turn away customers who are too young or who lack identification.
CONCLUSION
As Justice Cardozo observed long ago, if the Constitution left the states free to sabotage their neighbors' ventures by "project [ing] [their] legislation into [neighboring states]," then "the door [will be] opened to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce between the states to the power of the nation." 366 The Tenth Circuit and Justice Gorsuch, in their haste to affirm what they likely viewed as socially beneficial legislation, failed to heed this lesson. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will set things right, sparing us from a return to the "rivalries and reprisals" that nearly doomed our nation in its infancy.
